Distribution assessment · 12388588 Canada Inc.
Sole Canadian distribution of the Nanoleaf Level 2 EV charger, assessed against the Clean Fuel Regulations. Every regulatory claim cites SOR/2022-140 by section.
The deposit structure lines up with the market. What decides this deal is not price — it is who owns the charging data, and whether the unit is legally a charging station at all.
Deposit
$299 CAD
Fully refundable, returned at 1,500 kWh. Level with Clearshot, below SWTCH, and half the $599 market ceiling.
Customer waits
5.1 mo
Their carrying cost is about $5 — 41% of what a Grizzl-E member gives up, on a deposit three times the size.
Value in the hardware
2–20%
Of what one unit earns in credits over its life. Whoever owns the cloud owns the rest.
Gates still open
Two
Data ownership under s.1(1), and whether the unit reports kWh and timestamp. Each is one email to Nanoleaf.
The price question is settled and the structure is sound. What is not settled is whether any credit revenue reaches 12388588 Canada Inc. at all — and until it is, the premise that this business is “funded by Clean Fuel Regulations credit revenue” is unproven. Set the assumptions below and the whole document follows them.
Interactive
Four unknowns decide this deal and none of them is settled. Set them here and the verdict, the unit economics and the channel call all follow. Nothing is hard-coded — the credit arithmetic is s.101(2) run live.
Credits per year
—
kWh per credit
—
s.75(7) election worth
—
Gross per year
—
Lifetime credit value
—
Of which reaches you
—
Break-even landed
—
Hardware margin
—
Box as share of stream
—
They front (HST)
—
Their carrying cost @ 4%
—
vs the $599 market ceiling
—
Customer waits
—
Credits cover the refund at
—
HST buried in a forfeit (s.182)
—
Credit is worth
—
You keep per kWh
—
Customer’s share
Customer earns / yr
—
You earn / yr
—
Customer, lifetime
—
You, lifetime
—
Channel that follows:
Credit yield runs the s.101(2) formula against Schedule 6 carbon intensities, calibrated so the defaults reproduce the report exactly. Margin stacks and the 4% alternative return are stated assumptions, not sourced. DERIVED
Section 01
Each is a yes/no question with a factual answer. Work them in order — there is no point negotiating price before the first two are settled.
Section 1(1) defines a charging station as a device “capable of communicating with a server … to report the quantity of electricity supplied and the time at which it is supplied.” P-LEG
Slide 18 of the EOI specifies Matter over Wi-Fi and Bluetooth pairing. It does not mention OCPP, and it does not mention server-side energy reporting.
If the unit cannot report kWh and a timestamp to a server, it creates zero credits at any price. ChargeLab’s OCPP 1.6+ requirement separately rules a non-OCPP unit out of that programme — but SWTCH, Clearshot, EcoCharge, DashSharing and Hypercharge all ship their own hardware and telemetry, so it is not a market-wide gate. This is a firmware and cloud-architecture question, not a commercial one, and it precedes everything else.
This is the subject of the next section. In short: under s.1(1) the data owner is the charging-network operator, and under s.102(1)(a) only the charging-network operator can create residential credits. A distribution agreement does not convey it.
It does not, and the arithmetic is unusually clean.
Residential Level 2 chargers sold in Canada, CAD, observed 25 August 2026. The Nanoleaf price is $700 USD converted at 1.384. S-TRADE
| Product | CAD | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Grizzl-E Club / SWTCH programme | $0 | free, refundable deposit |
| Grizzl-E Classic Connect 40A | $500 | |
| Autel AC Lite Home 40A | $640 | sale price |
| Grizzl-E Ultimate 48A | $650 | Canadian-made |
| FLO Home X3 50A | $699 | Canadian-made |
| ChargePoint Home Flex 50A | $709 | |
| Tesla Wall Connector 48A | $760 | |
| FLO Home X6 50A | $899 | |
| Watti Home Gen 2 48A | $940 | OCPP 1.6 |
| Nanoleaf, at $700 USD | $969 | the subject |
| FLO Home X8 80A / 19.2 kW | $1,499 | category ceiling |
To justify $969 against a rival that places the box free, the Nanoleaf programme must out-pay that rival. At 3,500 kWh/yr a five-year payback needs a premium of 5.5 ¢/kWh. Stacked on Grizzl-E’s headline 15 ¢ that means paying 20.5 ¢/kWh.
But in Ontario the entire gross credit stream is 36.3 ¢/kWh at $300/credit — and only 19.0 ¢/kWh at the 2024 average of $157. A 20.5 ¢ payout is loss-making before a single dollar of hardware, verification, software or customer acquisition. DERIVED
| Your unit out-pays the free rival by | at 3,500 kWh/yr | at 2,455 kWh/yr |
|---|---|---|
| parity — same rate | never | never |
| +1 ¢/kWh | 27.7 yr | 39.5 yr |
| +3 ¢/kWh | 9.2 yr | 13.2 yr |
| +5 ¢/kWh | 5.5 yr | 7.9 yr |
Against a three-year default warranty and a residential credit window that closes to new installs on 31 December 2030, none of these clear. The 3,500 kWh/yr figure is ChargeLab’s own and is self-interested; 2,455 is a bottom-up check on assumed inputs. both unsourced
Section 02
A $299 fully refundable security deposit, returned once the customer has charged 1,500 kWh. Does that line up with the competition?
Yes. At $299 against a 1,500 kWh trigger the offer sits inside the market band, returns the customer’s money in about five months, and is funded by credits before it comes due.
Six programmes already place a charger against a refundable deposit and pay per kWh, so on structure this is orthodox. The question was only ever whether the numbers were.
Refundable deposit a Canadian consumer fronts to join each programme. Every one of these places the charger for free in the end. S-TRADE
| Programme | Consumer fronts | vs proposed | Refund trigger |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChargeLab Rewards | $0 | — | no hardware — pays on the box you already own |
| Grizzl-E Club | $100 | 2.99× smaller | refundable; vests at 36 months |
| EcoCharge (BC) | $199 | 1.50× smaller | refundable; returned at 1,500 kWh |
| Proposed — 12388588 Canada Inc. | $299 | — | refundable; returned at 1,500 kWh |
| Clearshot Labs | $300 | 1.00× larger | refundable; 1,500 kWh within 12 months |
| SWTCH Home | $330 | 1.10× larger | $300 + $30 shipping; returned at ~1,500 kWh |
| DashSharing Ultra | $599 | 2.00× larger | 1,500 kWh, own terms — the market ceiling |
| Proposed — 12388588 Canada Inc. | $299 | — | refundable; returned at 1,500 kWh |
A deposit is not free to the person who pays it — their money is gone until it comes back. But the wait is what matters, not the amount, and a kWh trigger makes the wait short:
| Programme | Deposit | Returned when | Wait | Carrying cost @ 4% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grizzl-E Club | $100 | 36 months elapse | 36.0 mo | $12.49 |
| Proposed | $299 | 1,500 kWh charged | 5.1 mo | $5.07 |
| DashSharing Ultra | $599 | 1,500 kWh charged | 5.1 mo | $10.15 |
At a typical 3,500 kWh household the customer reaches 1,500 kWh in 5.1 months. Their real cost is $5.07 — 41% of what a Grizzl-E member gives up, despite a deposit three times the size, because Grizzl-E holds the money for three years. Against DashSharing Ultra — which refunds at the same 1,500 kWh — you ask half the deposit for the same wait. DERIVED
“If the deposit amount is refundable and is refunded by the supplier to the recipient, there are no tax consequences.”
GST Memorandum 300-6-8, Deposits (15 January 1991), para 8 P-GOV
CRA notes this memorandum has not been updated for later legislative changes.
A deposit is “an amount given by a recipient as security for the performance of an obligation” (para 5), and under ETA s.168(9) it is not consideration until the supplier applies it. Do not add HST — $299 is $299, which is how SWTCH treats its own deposit. Charge it in error and ETA s.232 permits, but does not require, a correction, and only within two years.
Tax does not disappear; it moves to forfeiture. If a customer forfeits, ETA s.182 deems the forfeited amount to already include tax at A/B × C, where B is 113% in Ontario — so a forfeited $299 is $264.60 of consideration plus $34.40 of HST you must remit. Price the forfeiture path accordingly. None of this is tax advice; have a tax advisor confirm the instrument before it is offered to consumers.
One Ontario unit: cumulative gross credit revenue at $320/credit against a $299 deposit returned at 1,500 kWh. DERIVED
| Month | Cumulative credit revenue | Refund obligation | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | $227 | $299 | $-72 |
| 3 | $341 | $299 | +$42 |
| 5 | $568 | $299 | +$269 |
| 6 | $682 | $299 | +$383 |
| 9 | $1,022 | $299 | +$723 |
| 12 | $1,363 | $299 | +$1,064 |
The French text of s.102(1)(a) is unambiguous where the English is not:
« par une borne de recharge dont sont propriétaires les occupants d’un logement privé et qui est destinée principalement à être utilisée par eux »
DORS/2022-140, art. 102(1)a) P-LEG
Both versions are equally authoritative; where one is ambiguous and the other clear, the clear one supplies the shared meaning (R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6). So the occupants must own the charger — and because s.102(1) tests its conditions during each compliance period, title passing at the refund does not retroactively qualify the months before it.
Title passes to the customer at delivery; the $299 is pure security. Grizzl-E’s published terms say the charger “always remains our property.” If this reading is right, the retained-title programmes carry a defect and yours is the compliant structure — the single most valuable thing available in this proposal, and worth far more than the deposit size. Pair it with an unconditional warranty: Grizzl-E’s “lifetime” cover requires 4–6 sessions a month with the company as “sole arbiter”, caps replacements at two a year, ships refurbished units after 60 days, and disables charging after ten sessions offline.
Section 03
“charging-network operator means a person who operates a communication platform that collects data on the electricity supplied by a charging station and who is the owner of that data.”
SOR/2022-140, s.1(1) P-LEG
For a residential charger that definition is the whole game. Section 101(1) expressly excludes “any charging station referred to in subsection 102(1)” from the site-host route, and s.102(1)(a) assigns charging at a private dwelling to the charging-network operator. The homeowner cannot create the credit. A distributor cannot create it by importing and selling the box. Only the party that operates the cloud and owns the data can.
One Ontario charger installed 2028, earning 31.89 credits across CP2028–2035 at 3,500 kWh/yr. DERIVED from Schedule 6 CIe and Ree 4.1.
| Credit price | Lifetime gross, 1 unit | $969 hardware | ~$250 landed |
|---|---|---|---|
| $157/credit | $5,007 | 19.4% | 5.0% |
| $200/credit | $6,379 | 15.2% | 3.9% |
| $300/credit | $9,568 | 10.1% | 2.6% |
| $400/credit | $12,758 | 7.6% | 2.0% |
The deck names OneRobotics Co. Limited — HK.6600, roughly USD 3.22B market capitalisation, 200+ engineers — as the technology partner. A grant applicant whose partner is a listed hardware group of that size is not going to assign the s.1(1) data-ownership position to a Canadian distributor. If Nanoleaf and OneRobotics own the platform and its data, then “funded by CFR credit revenue” is unfunded at any hardware price.
That is not a price negotiation. It is the deal, and it is walk-away term #1.
Section 04
The formula, the inputs, and where each one actually lives. Two of the load-bearing numbers are not in the regulation at all.
Credits created per charger per year at 3,500 kWh, on 2026 numbers. Because CIe is subtracted in the s.102(2) formula, a low-carbon grid widens the gap. P-LEG DERIVED
| Province | Credits / charger / yr | kWh per credit | Gross @ $300 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quebec | 4.34 | 806 | $1,302 |
| Manitoba | 4.32 | 810 | $1,296 |
| British Columbia | 4.27 | 820 | $1,281 |
| Ontario | 4.23 | 827 | $1,269 |
| New Brunswick | 3.29 | 1,065 | $987 |
| Alberta | 1.66 | 2,109 | $498 |
| Nova Scotia | 1.58 | 2,209 | $474 |
| Saskatchewan | 1.42 | 2,464 | $426 |
Sections 101(2) and 102(2) use identical arithmetic. For residential charging the operative provision is s.102(2) — s.101 is the charging-site-host route, and s.101(1) expressly excludes any station referred to in s.102(1):
credits (tCO₂e) = CIdiff × (Q × D) × 10⁻⁶
CIdiff = (Ree × CIref) − CIe
| Input | Value / meaning | Where it lives | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| D | 3.6 MJ/kWh, hard-coded in the formula | ss.101(2), 102(2) | P-LEG |
| Q | kWh measured by the station, to NIST Handbook 44 tolerances | ss.101(2), 102(2) | P-LEG |
| Ree | 4.1 for light/medium-duty EVs ≤ 2,722 kg | ECCC Specifications for Fuel LCA Model CI Calculations v4.0, s.9.4, Table 9, p.129 — not in the regulation | P-GOV |
| Ree floor | 2.5, available “at the election of the registered creator” | ss.101(2), 102(2) | P-LEG |
| CIe | Provincial electricity carbon intensity | Schedule 6 | P-LEG |
| Rounding | Credits round to the nearest whole number | s.163(4) | P-LEG |
The Ree risk is real but monitorable. ECCC can revise the Specifications without amending SOR/2022-140, and ss.101(2)/102(2) pin whatever it says each 1 January. But ECCC pre-publishes proposed changes — v4.1 and v4.2 are already public and both leave 4.1 unchanged. Notably, ECCC’s own rationale records that the National Research Council independently computed a BEV energy efficiency ratio of 4.2 — higher than 4.1. The only independent public check points up, not down.
Section 75(7) provides that the carbon intensity of electricity for a province is, “at the election of the registered creator”, either the amount in Schedule 6 s.9 or the amount in ECCC’s Specifications. Schedule 6 is fixed in the regulation and changes only by amendment; the Specifications table moves.
| Province | Schedule 6 | Specs v4.0 | kWh/credit, 2028 install | Election worth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alberta | 218 | 166 | 2,294 → 1,605 | +43% |
| Nova Scotia | 224 | 204 | 2,414 → 2,057 | +17.4% |
| Saskatchewan | 237 | 218 | 2,721 → 2,294 | +18.6% |
| Ontario | 14 | 12 | 855 → 849 | +0.7% |
| New Brunswick | 89 | 91 | 1,111 → 1,120 | −0.8% |
The election is worth more the later you install, which is counter-intuitive and useful. CIref falls from 85.3 in 2026 to 80.1 from 2030, so the gap between two CIe values becomes a larger share of a shrinking CIdiff. Alberta’s election is worth 28% on 2026 numbers and 42.9% on a 2028 install. It is a hedge that grows over the asset’s life.
It also caps downside. Because Schedule 6 is fixed in law, an adverse Specifications revision is simply not taken — the proposed v4.2 nearly doubles Ontario from 12 to 22, which the model shows as −2.5% if you were forced onto it, and zero if you are not. Favourable moves flow through; unfavourable ones you decline.
One caution before relying on it. Electing differently in different provinces within one compliance period — the “better of the two” option in the model — is an interpretation of the election’s granularity, not a stated permission in the text. s.75(7) is drafted per province, which is what makes the reading plausible, but it has not been confirmed. Put it to counsel before building a plan on it. Everything else in this panel is the regulation as written.
A registered creator files an annual verified report and carries a ten-year Canadian record-keeping obligation (s.166). Third-party verification is mandatory and must be performed by a body accredited by the Standards Council of Canada — of which there are roughly nine nationally, with mandatory rotation, and the electricity-scope subset is smaller still.
The enforcement tail is the part that belongs on a balance sheet. Sections 157, 158 and 160 provide excess-credit clawback with 5-day and 60-day notice clocks, and s.158(3) permits the Minister to suspend credits subsequently deposited. Section 103(6) can compel a forced open-market repurchase inside 90 days — unhedged, and triggered by exactly the price spikes that make the case look attractive in the first place.
Section 103(1) requires a charging-network operator to spend all of its credit-transfer revenue on “expanding electric vehicle charging infrastructure, including charging stations,” or on EV-ownership incentives. Two consequences run in opposite directions:
If you are the operator, gross credit revenue is not margin. It is ring-fenced, reportable under s.125, and carries the s.103(6) buy-back tail.
If you sell hardware to an operator, s.103 works in your favour — but read it precisely. It is not a spending order; it is a condition on creating credits: an operator must not create new credits unless all revenue from earlier transfers was used for a permitted activity. And there are two doors, not one — s.103(1)(a) expanding EV charging infrastructure, or s.103(1)(b) reducing the cost of EV ownership through financial incentives — with s.103(2) leaving the allocation to the operator’s discretion and s.103(3) setting a deadline of the second anniversary of the compliance period in which the credit was transferred. An operator could route every dollar to (b) and never buy a charger. The pull on hardware demand is real but indirect. What is unambiguous is that a vendor sits entirely outside s.103: no ECCC registration, no verified reporting, no revenue report, no buy-back tail.
The route this report recommends threads between the two — see Channels.
Section 05
The business case and the regulation are running on two clocks that do not fit inside each other.
The deck’s 24-month programme against s.102(1)(a), which requires a charger to be installed on or before 31 December 2030 to ever create a credit. P-LEG P-DECK
| Clock | Starts | Ends | Length |
|---|---|---|---|
| Development programme (deck) | Mar 2026 | ~Q2 2028 | 24 months |
| Qualifying installation window | ~Q2 2028 | 31 Dec 2030 | ~2.5 years |
| Credit earning tail | on install | CP2035 | to 2035 |
| Quebec Écorecharge framework | — | 31 Mar 2028 | expires at launch |
Three different questions get three different answers, and conflating them is the easiest way to misjudge this deal.
| Question | Answer | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Do the Regulations expire? | No. There is no sunset clause. The word “sunset” does not appear, and the only repeal provision (s.175) repeals the Renewable Fuels Regulations, not these. | P-LEG full-text search |
| Do residential credits expire? | Yes, twice over. The station must be installed on or before 31 December 2030, and the compliance period must begin on or before 1 January 2035. That date appears exactly once in the whole regulation — here. | P-LEG s.102(1)(a) |
| Do light-commercial site-host credits expire? | No date at all. s.101 carries neither an installation deadline nor an end compliance period. Its only limit is that the station must not be one described in s.102(1). | P-LEG s.101(1) |
This is the strongest argument for the recommended channel. The residential route dies on a schedule written into the regulation. The non-public light-commercial route under s.101 — the one this report recommends, where retained title makes 12388588 Canada Inc. the charging-site host — is not time-limited by the regulation at all. Everything in Section 04 above describes a cliff that the recommended channel simply does not stand on.
No expiry in the instrument is not the same as no risk. The Regulations are amendable by the Governor in Council at any time, and credit prices are set by a policy-driven market. What the text gives you is that nothing has to happen for s.101 credits to continue — a repeal or amendment would have to be actively made. That is a materially better position than relying on a stream the regulation already schedules to stop.
Two secondary collisions land in the same window. Quebec’s Écorecharge normative framework ends 31 March 2028 P-GOV — the quarter the product is scheduled to ship, and the rebate that does most to make a paid charger viable in Canada. And BC’s rebate funding is available “on a first-come first-served basis while funding lasts”: open in August 2026 is not a commitment for 2028.
Section 06
B2B wins — and the deciding reason is not margin. It is that the only channel in Canada where a distributor can hold a credit position in its own right is a B2B one.
Non-public light-commercial with retained title makes 12388588 Canada Inc. the s.101 charging-site host and the registered creator: no s.103 ring-fence, no 2030 install deadline, no s.107 price floor, and the s.79(1) self-determined carbon intensity election becomes available. Direct-to-consumer delivers the best gross margin per unit in the stack — into a residential market that clears at $0, attaching no credit revenue at all unless Nanoleaf grants the s.1(1) position.
| # | Channel | Order size | Sales cycle | Credit revenue attaches | Capital |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Non-public light-commercial, retained title workplace, condo common areas, fleet depots | 2–8 / site | 3–9 mo; 6–18 for condo boards | Directly — you are the registered creator. No s.103, no 2030 deadline | High pending MOQ |
| 2 | Installer / electrical-contractor dealer network | 10–50 / order | 1–3 mo to sign | Only if you also hold the credit position | Med–high |
| 3 | Direct to consumer — own e-commerce | 1 | Immediate | None unless you are the operator | Medium |
| 4 | Marketplace — Amazon.ca and the top-10 NA marketplaces | 1 | Immediate | None | Medium |
| 5 | Big-box retail — the deck names a Home Depot channel manager and 6,500 NA stores | 100–1,000+ / PO | 9–18 mo to a planogram slot | None | Highest |
| 6 | Two-step electrical distribution — Nedco, Guillevin, Westburne | 20–200 / branch | 6–12 mo to a line card | None | Medium, thinnest margin |
| 7 | Builder / developer, EV-ready new construction | — | 12–24 mo | None | Low return — the order is conduit and receptacles, not chargers |
| 8 | Route volume to an aggregator — ChargeLab, SWTCH, Grizzl-E | 500–5,000+ | 3–6 mo | To them, not to you | Lowest — but it concedes the thesis |
Order sizes are derived from the shape of each transaction, not from a supply contract. Capital intensity is pending the MOQ, which the deck does not contain. Sales-cycle figures for Canadian electrical distributors and big-box line reviews are not public and are estimates. UNVERIFIED
One caution on repositioning. A residential wall box cannot be moved into the $1,499–$4,095 networked commercial band by pricing alone. That band buys OCPP plus RFID access control, payment handling and load management, and carries $210–$336 per port per year of network subscription. Rank 1 above is for non-public light-commercial served by a residential-grade connected unit — workplace, fleet, condo-resident — where load management is needed but RFID and payments are not.
Section 07
The EOI contains no landed cost, no minimum order quantity, no stocking terms and no draft term sheet — and no embedded workbook. Rather than invent one, this solves for the number that decides the deal.
The maximum landed cost at which each channel clears its own margin stack. Margin assumptions are conventional consumer-electronics stacks, stated not sourced. DERIVED
| Channel | $649 | $699 | $799 | $899 | $969 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DTC, 40% gross margin | $389 | $419 | $479 | $539 | $581 |
| Two-step distribution, 30% + 25% | $341 | $367 | $419 | $472 | $509 |
| Big box, 32% + 4% + 20% | $339 | $365 | $417 | $469 | $506 |
The 27.5% MSRP rise almost certainly did not come from the bill of materials. A product moving from $549 to $700 USD between a March grant application and a distribution conversation is repricing, not re-costing. That makes landed cost negotiable, and it makes ≤ ~$250 CAD the number worth anchoring on for a credit-backed business.
Section 08
This is a grant application, not a term sheet — the distribution deal is entirely unnegotiated. That is an advantage: nothing has been conceded yet.
| # | Term | Position |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Canadian charging-data ownership | Get it in writing: either data ownership for Canada assigned to 12388588 Canada Inc., or a binding commitment to a s.21(1)(a) agreement naming it registered creator — s.23(5) then vests ownership of the credits in it. Without one, the credit premise is false. |
| 2 | Landed cost ≤ ~$400 | Above ~$550 the deal fails in every channel modelled. |
| 3 | s.1(1) charging-station conformance | Must report kWh and timestamp to a server. Without it the SKU creates zero credits at any price. |
| 4 | OCPP 1.6 or newer | Plus an immutable per-unit serial exposed through the cloud API — Schedule 11, s.6(c)(i). The de facto onboarding gate for every aggregator. |
| 5 | Certification in hand | cUL / cETL / cQPS / CSA / ULC, plus CSA C22.2 No. 280 (UL 2594) and No. 281.1 (UL 2231). Whose cost, on what schedule. Without it: no BC rebate, no Quebec listing, no electrical permit. |
| 6 | s.103 liability allocation | The regulation says “the charging-network operator or person” throughout ss.103(2)–(8) with no allocation rule. Demand explicit allocation, a cap, and an indemnity running to you. |
| 7 | MOQ with price protection and stock rotation | A take-or-pay MOQ on a NACS-transition-exposed SKU with neither is where distributors die. |
| 8 | Exclusivity that binds both ways | Minimum-volume relief, a cure period, termination-for-convenience symmetry. Exclusivity that binds only you is a stocking commitment. |
| Issue | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| 48 A vs “7.4 kW output” — both on slide 18 | At 240 V, 48 A is ~11.5 kW; 7.4 kW is ~32 A at 230 V. These cannot both be true. It changes credit yield (Q), the CE Code Section 86 load calculation, the service the install needs, and the price tier the product can hold. |
| “Type 2” vs J3400/NACS | Slide 19 calls it a Type 2 charger. Type 2 (IEC 62196-2) is the European connector and is wrong for North America. Slide 18 specifies J3400/NACS with a magnetic J1772 adapter. |
| No OCPP named anywhere | Gate 1. See Section 01. |
| OCI ask stated twice, differently | $600,000 on slide 10; $1,000,000 on slide 24. |
| Budget does not reconcile | $3,920,021 (slide 10) vs $3,930,000 (slide 24). Slide 24’s matching $2,860,000 + $1,000,000 = $3,860,000, which matches neither. Slide 10 shows $6,033,400 in funds against a $3.92M budget — a ~$2.1M surplus, unexplained. |
| OVIN obligations unseen | Grant funding and the Ontario-design commitments may constrain what an exclusive distributorship can be granted. Confirm against the actual OVIN/OCI agreement — not read for this assessment. |
Section 09
The actual filing path, in order. Every link below was opened and checked on 26 August 2026 — anything that would not load was left out rather than guessed at.
Before anything else, each person who will act for the corporation needs a Government of Canada sign-in. Credentials are personal and must not be shared.
s.25 registration as a registered creator, filed through CATS. Schedule 3 sets out exactly what the registration report must contain.
If another party operates the charging network, s.21 is the mechanism that names who creates the credits — and s.22 sets the deadline that decides whether you earn for the year at all.
The annual credit-creation report and its contents.
Third-party verification is mandatory and must come from a body the Standards Council of Canada has accredited for the Clean Fuel Regulations.
The regulation, the carbon-intensity specifications and the workbook every number in this assessment traces back to.
Two things you cannot link to, and one to be careful of. The CATS registration buttons are JavaScript-driven with href="#", so “Open a CFR Account in CATS” cannot be deep-linked — a first-time registrant has to click it from the CATS home page. And ECCC still lists the current CATS User Guide (v3.1) without a hyperlink, annotated “update on this page to be available at a later date”; request it from cfsncp@ec.gc.ca rather than relying on the superseded v1.1 PDF.
Contact of record for the programme: cfsncp@ec.gc.ca (ECCC Low Carbon Fuels Division), and modeleacvcarburant-fuellcamodel@ec.gc.ca for the Fuel LCA Model.
Section 10
Listed rather than filled in. Nothing below was estimated into the analysis without being marked.
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| Landed cost, MOQ, stocking terms, draft term sheet | Absent from the EOI; no embedded workbook. Every capital-intensity figure is marked pending. |
| Canadian charging-data ownership | Not addressed anywhere in the deck. Walk-away term #1. |
| Whether the unit reports kWh + timestamp to a server, and whether it speaks OCPP | Not stated. Gate 1. |
| Charging-network operator procurement pricing | No CNO publishes what it pays per unit. The ~$280–$425 target is derived from retail anchors. |
| Revenue splits published by aggregators | None of ChargeLab, SWTCH, Grizzl-E, Hypercharge, Targray or MetroEV publishes one. |
| Order sizes, sales cycles and margin structure for Canadian electrical distributors and big box | Not public. Ranked on the axes the evidence supports; the rest marked estimated. |
| Certification cost and calendar time | Quoted per project; no published price or turnaround. Get a lab quote before committing to a launch date. |
| Occupant-ownership requirement under the French text of s.102(1)(a) | The French requires occupants to be the owners of the station; Grizzl-E’s published terms state the charger “always remains our property.” Two verbatim facts pointing opposite ways — the highest-value diligence item after data ownership, and one that may favour a purchased-hardware structure. |
| OVIN / OCI agreement terms | Not seen. May constrain an exclusive distributorship. |
Sources
Claims graded P-LEG, P-GOV or S-TRADE link to the primary source behind them. DERIVED marks our own arithmetic and UNVERIFIED means no source was found — neither carries a link, because there is nothing to link to. The full set, deduplicated and each one opened and checked before publication.